ESSAY

PREVENTING INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND PROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH MORE EFFECTIVE LEGAL,
POLITICAL, AND AID STRUCTURES: FOCUS ON AFRICA

Paul J. Magnarella*
The prevalence of interethnic conflict and attendant human rights
violations represent major threats to contemporary world order. The
amelioration of these disruptive conditions should become a major concern
of the United Nations and its member states. This paper recommends and
briefly outlines three types of constitutive processes that should sharply
reduce interethnic strife and associated human rights violations. These
recommendations call for the creation, where feasible, of federations or
cultural autonomous regional governments; a change in the Statute of the
International Court of Justice so as to permit governments of federated units
or autonomous regions standing before the Court; and the conditioning of
international aid on the recipient states' human rights record.
This paper is based on two sets of assumptions: one humanistic, the other
infrastructural. This writer assumes that people generally want to be able to
make authoritative decisions over their own lives; enjoy some level of
economic, physical and health security; have access to educational opportunities; and enjoy the respect of their fellows, the affection of their friends and
families, and the spiritual benefits of their chosen religions. He also believes
that just systems for distributing and earning these values promote human
dignity and a more peaceful world order. These humanistic givens, with
their emphasis on the universal needs of people, resonate with the international goals expressed in the Preamble to the U.N. Charter. The Preamble
reaffirms faith in the fundamental human rights, dignity and worth of
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everyone, and calls on member states to employ the international machinery
to promote the economic and social advancement of all people.
Here, infrastructure refers to the relationships among demography, food
production, natural resources, medical resources, housing, technology, capital,
and other factors that are essential for the realization of the human values
listed above. This writer assumes that a secure infrastructural base promotes
respect for human rights, while insufficient infrastructural conditions increase
the probability of human rights violations. It is no coincidence that in many
of the world's poorer countries, the following elements comprise the system
of human rights violations:
(1) Undeveloped economies, with limited resource bases and insufficient
employment/income opportunities for large segments of the population
resulting in wide-spread poverty.
(2) High population growth rates further straining the natural environment
and local resources, while intensifying competition for resources.
(3) Ethnic diversity and/or regional factionalism promoting local/particularistic identifications, while hindering the development of a national
identification.
(4) Ethnic and/or class politics involving competition among leaders of
different language, cultural, or regional populations for state positions of
political and economic power with the spoils of victory going to supporters.
(5) Lack of regime legitimacy as those large segments of the population
not culturally and/or politically affiliated with the ruling elite and not sharing
in the spoils refuse to recognize the regime as legitimate.
(6) Resort to military/police force to maintain power by suppressing
political opponents and disgruntled civilians.
(7) Violation of economic, civil, and political rights by the regime in the
name of "national security."

I. AFRICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE
With a population of 630 million in 1988, Africa is growing faster than
any other region in the world.' Its population has been increasing by 3.1%
annually, while its food supply grows at only 1.1%. Large scale malnutrition, starvation, and heavy reliance on food imports are already common.

'The data in this section come primarily from: Population Inst., A Special Report by the
Population Institute to the 101st Congress, No. 8, A Continent in Crises: Building a Future
for Africa in the 21st Century (1988).
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The U.N.'s Food and Agricultural Organization predicts that by the dawn of
the 21st century, 29 African states will be unable to feed their populations.
In recent decades, climatic changes and attempts by Africa's growing
population to find living space, food and fuel wood have been converting
former croplands into deserts and rapidly eliminating the forests. Between
1850 and 1980, Africa lost 60% of its forest cover. Without trees and plants
to hold the soil, absorb rainfall, and provide for transpiration back into the
atmosphere, rainfall amounts decline. With less moisture, there will be fewer
new plants and trees. Hence, a damaging cycle of depleting vegetation,
expanding desert, and reduced rainfall, exacerbated by the increasing
environmental demands of a rapidly growing population has already begun.
In addition to conditions of excessive population growth, environmental
degradation and natural resource depletion, Sub-Saharan Africa's stunted
economic development has been caused by a lack of capital and highly
skilled personnel, ongoing civil strife, heavy external debt, colonial
exploitation, and mismanagement by African governments. Domestically,
these conditions lead to intensive competition among people for limited
resources. Rival factions develop along, inter alia, political, class, ethnic,
and regional lines. In their struggle for domination, human rights abuses
become inevitable.
Governments attempt to achieve security from external threats by arming
their militaries and forming alliances. Regimes commonly associate internal
threats to their rule with external enemies, thereby justifying the use of
armed force against domestic opponents. They react to real and perceived
threats to internal security by building up their militaries and police forces.
The arms imports of developing countries between 1975 and 1985 totaled
40% of the increase in their foreign debt in that period.2 In 1983, for
example, Sub-Saharan African states spent $6.25 billion on their militaries
and $2.22 billion on arms imports.3
In the process of strengthening their security forces, poorer countries
become dependent on richer ones for weapons and other military aid. They
also divert valuable human power as well as their country's scarce resources
and limited capital to basically non-productive sectors, thereby further
weakening their domestic economies. Third World military expenditures in
constant prices increased six-fold from 1960 to 1983, unemployment eight-

2 RutH L. SIvARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SocIAL ExPENDrnm

' Id. at 35.

5 (1986).
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fold." Given these conditions, large segments of the civilian population are
left without adequate resources to secure even life's basic necessities. These
people lose faith in the government, refuse to grant it legitimacy, and may
even actively oppose it. Their deprivations become the underlying cause of
threats to the regime. Ruling elites too frequently respond to these civilian
challenges to their positions of power by employing the forces of armed
suppression, thereby violating human rights in the name of national security.
The above scenario is further complicated by the diverse ethnic compositions
of most Third World countries.
I. ETHNIC PLURALrTY AND MiNoRrrY STATUS
In the twentieth century, ethnonationalism or politicized ethnicity
represents a major legitimator and delegitimator of regimes. A government's
legitimacy rests, in significant degree, on its ability to convince the governed
that it either shares, represents, or respects their ethnicity. Despite the
ethno-nationalist rhetoric following World War I, most of the emerged states
were not true "nation states." Most incorporated multi-ethnic populations
and subsequently experienced inter-ethnic conflict. Today many states are
wrestling with two conflicting principles: 1) the right of nations to
self-determination; and 2) the inviolability and political integrity of sovereign
territory, regardless of how that territory may have been acquired or how
culturally diverse its population may be. There are few, if any, states or
political systems that do not feel the pressures of politicized ethnic assertion.
Ethnicity is not independent of socioeconomic structures, but neither is it
simply epiphenomenal to them. Ethnic identity cuts across class boundaries.
Daniel Bell writes that "ethnicity has become more salient [than class]
because it can combine an interest with an effective tie."5 Rothschild has
argued that the most emotionally intense type of political solidarity is
currently anchored in ethnic, rather than in class or formal ideological
affinities, although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive.6
Currently, over 90% of today's states contain at least one ethnic minority,
and about 40% of the world's states contain more than five sizable ethnic

IId. at 4.
Daniel Bell, Ethnicity and Social Change, in ETHNICrrY, 141, 169 (Nathan Glazer et al.
eds., 1975).
6JOSEPH ROTHsCHiLD, ETHNOPOLmcs: A CONCEpTuAL FRAMEWORK 173 (1981).
5
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populations. 7 About half of the world's states have recently experienced
inter-ethnic strife, which has been more violent than class or doctrinal
conflict! Most of the world's 12 to 15 million refugees in the early 1980s
fled their countries because of "ethnic, tribal or religious persecution" as
dominant ethnic populations attempted to maintain their political and
economic power at the expense of less dominant ones.9 Even though a
prohibition on systematic racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination by any
state against its own citizens has achieved the status of customary international law,' ° such discrimination is unfortunately ubiquitous.
The vast majority of Sub-Saharan African states contain several to dozens
of different linguistic populations. These states were created after World
War II and decolonialization. European powers drew their boundaries with
little regard for the political affiliations, or lack thereof, of encapsulated
indigenous populations. Subsequently, many African leaders have relied on
the support of fellow tribesmen or cultural affiliates to achieve and maintain
positions of power. In return, these leaders have often favored their
supporters with privileged access to the limited available resources. Such
tribal or ethnic politics, which favors the few over the many, has not and
cannot generate the generality of legitimacy necessary for regime stability.
and internal security.
Many progressive Africans believed that, despite a country's tribal, ethnic,
cultural, and regional diversity, the development of a shared national identity
and state stability could be achieved if pre-state tribal, regional, or other
particularistic affiliations were eliminated. Hence, many African leaders
supported the state form and strong central governments. Consequently, of
the over forty Sub-Saharan states, only about five allow opposition parties.
The remainder are evenly divided between one party states and military

See CONFUICr AND PEACEMAKING
1990).

IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (Joseph V.

Montville ed.,

8 Rothschild, supra note 6, at 120.
9Jason Clay, Ethnicity: The Hidden Cause of the World's Refugees, 6 Cultural Survival
Q. 4, 57 (1982).
" See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1871
I.C.J. 4 (June 21). "[T]o enforce... distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, and limitations
exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which
constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and
principles of the [U.N.] Charter." Id. at 57.
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dictatorships." None of these states tolerates an independent judiciary.
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, R.W. Farrand, recently noted that the one-party African systems
usually do not allow freedom of the press, opposing political views, or
religious expression. They also restrict freedom of peaceful association and
assembly. 2 Generally, military governments are even more repressive.
Under their rule, violations of human rights are widespread. Throughout the
world, military rule imperils the development of democratic political
structures. In the Third- World, about 50% of all states are militarily
dominated; 90% of the people in those states do not enjoy full voting
rights. 3 Military governments are more than twice as likely as other Third
World governments to frequently employ torture and other violent forms of
repression against the populace."' More than 50% have made frequent use
of torture, brutality, disappearances, and political
killings to eliminate
5
population.
the
intimidate
and
opponents
political
Furthermore, military governments usually devote inordinate amounts of
their state budgets to military expenditures. Their extravagant weapons
purchases have created huge public debts for future generations. Pursuing
military power while neglecting social needs has increased the number of
Africans suffering from ill-health, chronic hunger, and illiteracy.
In his report on human rights to a sub-committee of the House of
Representatives, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, K.L.
Brown, could name only three Sub-Saharan African states (Botswana,
Mauritius, and Gambia) that are functioning multiparty parliamentary
democracies with excellent human rights records.' 6 He noted that civil war
or ethnic strife reigned in Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, The
Sudan, and South Africa, and created masses of refugees, widespread human
rights abuses, and large-scale loss of life. 7

nJason Clay, Nation, Tribe and Ethnic Group in Africa, 9 Cultural Survival Q. 3 (1985).
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Current Pol'y No. 1148, Human Rights

12 Bureau

Issues in Africa 1 (1989).
13 Sivard, supra note 2, at 7.
14 Id.

at 5.

"5Id. at 7.
16 Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Current Pol'y No. 1148, Human Rights
Issues in Africa 1 (1989).
17 id.
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III. ALTERNATWVES TO THE CLASSIC NATION-STATE FORM

In many cases of repressive majority-minority relations, the classic unitary
"nation-state" has proved to be a dangerous fiction. Attempts by state
governments to force diverse cultural populations into the majority ethnic
mold have frequently led to human rights abuses. 18 As one commentator
has noted, "[plost-independence efforts to eliminate tribal identities may have
contributed significantly to Africa's catastrophic problems."' 9 Historically,
diverse ethnic populations with a tradition of mutual animosity have not
found common citizenship in a single state a sufficient basis for social
harmony. On the contrary, the state form has simply become the new arena
for interethnic political and economic battles.
In those cases where peoples of different ethnicities are intermingled
within the same territory, a culturally pluralistic, single state may be
necessary. However, in cases of intrastate, interethnic strife involving
cultural populations who are numerically dominant in different regions of the
country, at least two structural alternatives to the pluralistic state are
possible. One structural solution involves restructuring the state with
autonomous, ethnic cantons that form a confederation on the Swiss model.
Another possibility is the creation of autonomous cultural regions on the
Italian model. Both the Swiss cantons and the Italian system of decentralization have integrated culturally diverse populations into a single modem state
while simultaneously observing human rights and ethnic minority status.
Federations differ from unitary states in that the political units comprising
a federation retain limited sovereignty and exclusive competence within
specified governmental realms. A federation's central government provides
the unifying force, while the separate regional governments provide for
cultural diversity. The federation's central government generally has
exclusive competence in the areas of foreign relations, defense, constitutional
courts, national transportation, postal and other communication services.
Unless clearly provided for in its constitution, a federation's various units
may not have the right of self-determination. For example, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia on January 14, 1991, annulled Slovenia's July 1990

"SSee generally Leo Kuper, The Sovereign Territorial State: The Right to Genocide, in
HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMuNrrY (Richard P. Claude et al. eds., 1989) (critique
of the sovereign territorial state and its relationship to genocide).
19Clay, supra note 11, at 2.
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sovereignty declaration on the grounds that it was unconstitutional."
Slovenia refused to recognize the court's competence, however, and stood by
its December 1990 declaration of independence. 2 ' War between the
Serbian-dominated federal army and Slovenia ensued.
By contrast, Czech government officials recognized as legitimate the
declaration of sovereignty issued by the parliament of the Slovak Republic
on July 17, 1992. In their meeting on August 26, 1992, Czech Premier
the
Vaclav Klaus and Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar amicably agreed that
22
1993.
1,
January
of
as
dissolved
be
would
Czechoslovak Federation
In the case of a state with one or more autonomous units, the central
government delegates some degree of executive and legislative governmental
powers to a local body. The local government is not, however, independent
of the central legislature which can override many, but not all, local
decisions. Italy, for example, has five special autonomous regions with
extensive local powers defined by the constitution: Trentino-Alto Adige
(containing the German-speaking people of the South Tyrol), Fruili-Venezia
Giulia (containing Slovene and Friulian speakers), Val d'Aosta (containing
French speakers), as well as the islands of Sardinia and Sicily. Each of these
regions has unique, "non-Italian" cultural, linguistic, and historical characteristics that have justified extensive delegations of powers from Rome to the
regional authorities to permit decision-making on local educational,
economic, cultural, and budgetary issues.
Of these five, the Trentino-Alto Adige Region, with its German-speaking
province of Brixen (Bolzano), is of special interest. The region, which had
been part of Austria-Hungary, was acquired by Italy after World War I, as
a condition of Italy's participation in the war against the Central Powers.
Subsequent attempts by the Fascist government of Benito Mussolini to
Italianize the German-speaking population there created local resentment and
international concern over possible human rights violations. After World
War II, Austria took an active interest in the fate of the South Tyrolese--a
people with close cultural and historic ties to the Austrian Tyrolese living in
and around Innsbruck. After Austria registered formal complaints with the

2'

News Digest for January 1991, Keesing's Rec. of World Events, at 37973.

21

For a discussion of these events and their international reaction, see generally Marc

Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 569 (1992) (discussing the events surrounding the declaration

of independence by Slovenia and the international reaction to them).
" Czechoslovakia to Divide at Beginning of 1993, 52 Facts on File 648 (Sept. 3, 1992).
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United Nations, Italy began negotiating in earnest with both Austrian and
South Tyrolese representatives. In 1969 the parties agreed on a 'Package'
of 137 points as well as an 'Operational Calendar' that would grant cultural
autonomy to the South Tyrolese. The Package, which would become Italy's
new Autonomy Statute, granted the Province Brixen (Bolzano) primary and
secondary legislative competence in a wide range of areas, including
education, culture, transport, communications, tourism, housing, finance, and
employment.23
As between Italy and its South Tyrolese citizens, the agreement became
a series of state laws, one of which granted the provincial governments
concerned standing to contest state laws and to bring conflicts of powers
arising out of administrative measures of the State before the constitutional
court.' As between Italy and Austria, the agreement was an international
treaty, registered with the United Nations Secretary General. In the event of
a disagreement or an alleged failure on the part of the Italian government to
abide by the Operational Calendar, Austria had standing to bring a complaint
before the International Court of Justice.' In essence, Austria became the
international guarantor of the autonomy plan and the international protector
of the South Tyrolese. Hence, in their efforts to secure and preserve their
cultural autonomy, the South Tyrolese had recourse both to the Italian
constitutional court and, through Austria, to the International Court of
Justice. As a consequence of repeated South Tyrolese demands, sporadic
acts of terrorism by small South Tyrolese radical groups, Italy's good
intentions and Austria's international pressure, the Italian government finally
completed the implementation of the Package in 1992 to the satisfaction of
all parties.'
Consequently, the Italian-Austrian-South Tyrolese arrangement proved to
be an effective, albeit uncommon method for an ethnic minority to protect
its human rights and achieve a form of self-determination. However, the

2

For a discussion and complete list of the 137 points, see ANTONY E. ALCOCK, THE

HISTORY OF THE SOUTH TYROL QUESTION 433-54 (1970).
24 See id. at 440 (addressing point 62 of the Package).

Id. at 468.
6 Michael Z. Wise, Minority in Tirol Reassured; Austria and Italy see Pact as Model,
WASH. PoST, June 6, 1992 at A17.
2
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vast majority of ethnic minorities 27 do not have kindred nation-states next
door that are willing to interfere in the internal affairs of their sovereign
neighbors at the risk of jeopardizing their own national interests. A more
general international mechanism is needed to protect cultural minority rights.
Although the words "all peoples have the right to self-determination" appear
in the texts of major international covenants, international law has yet to
unequivocally support the self-determination claims of subjected national
populations beyond the context of classical colonialism.2
In all three of the arrangements described above, the following minimal
measures must be taken in order to reduce significantly and 29hopefully
eliminate the causes of minority oppression and state instability:

2 Two concepts of importance to this discussion are "minority" and "ethnic community."
According to the Special Rapporteur, for purposes of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, "minority" may be taken to refer to:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in
a non-dominant position, whose members--being nationals of the
State--possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion
or language.
Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.I (1979) at 96. Based on a U.N. study of discrimination against
indigenous populations, "ethnic communities" may be taken to refer to:
Indigenous communities, peoples or nations are those which having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of
them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural
patterns, social institutions and legal systems ....
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 2, at 50-51 (1986).
28 S. James Anaya, The Capacity of InternationalLaw to Advance Ethnic or Nationality
Rights Claims, 75 IowA L. REV. 837, 838 (1990).
9 For a slightly different version of a minority recognition proposal, see Hurst Hannum,
The Limits of Sovereignty and Majority Rule: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and the Rights
to Autonomy, in NEw DiREc'roNs IN HUMAN RIGHTS 18-22 (E.L. Lutz, et al. eds. 1989)
(proposing (1) an end to violations of widely accepted individual rights; (2) an effective
means for minority participation in the larger society; (3) the retention of attributes which
make the minority culture unique; (4) minority groups must in turn accept that the majority
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(1) The state must establish an independent judiciary.
(2) The state must incorporate the various U.N. human rights conventions
into its domestic law.
(3) The state constitution must place a duty on the state to guarantee all
citizens legal equality and non-discrimination, while also granting injured
citizens standing in court to initiate claims when these guarantees have been
broken.
(4) The state constitution must guarantee minority cultural rights,
including the rights to speak, teach, and write their own language; to practice
their own religion; and to practice other aspects of their cultures to the extent
that such practice does not infringe on the rights of others.
(5) Government and military officials as well as the powerful elite must
be responsive to judicial decisions.
(6) Minority populations must be permitted some effective means of
participating in the political process. This may involve the institution of
weighted, rather than strictly numerical voting, however the particular
mechanisms chosen should vary somewhat with each state's special
conditions.
(7) Minority populations must be permitted some effective means of
participating in the economic process. In the case of underclass minorities,
special programs such as land redistribution, vocational and special
education, housing, and cooperative formation may be necessary.
In those states whose culturally diverse populations are so intermingled
that no federal or regional arrangements are possible, some degree of
majority culture privilege is probably unavoidable. In exchange for the
above guarantees and special programs, minority populations must accept the
inevitable fact that the majority population and culture will be predominant
at the national/state level. For example, in states where numerous minorities
and languages exist, the selection of a single, official national language may
be necessary for the practical purposes of facilitating national and international communication.
The political stability of culturally pluralistic states and respect for the
rights of cultural minorities organized into federated or regional autonomous
units would be greatly enhanced by the creation of a universal judicial forum

culture and values will prevail at the state and national levels; and (5) the state societies

should recognize that sovereignty itself is meaningless-it is relevant only insofar as it
contributes to the development of societal consensus and responds to the needs of its
inhabitants.)
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to which such parties could turn to settle disputes peacefully.
candidate for such a forum is the International Court of Justice.

The best

IV. THE PRESENT ROLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
One of the United Nations' most important organs for the peaceful
settlement of disputes is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). "Third
party adjudication in international disputes is not only the civilized way to
settle those disputes, but is also more economical and less traumatic than the
other means to that end."' Unfortunately, at present, Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter (prohibiting U.N. interference in intra-state matters)
and Article 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (limiting
standing in contentious cases to state parties) effectively preclude the U.N.
and the ICJ from playing a continuously active and positive role in the
peaceful resolution of intra-state disputes between major ethnic populations,
such as the Kurds and Arabs of Iraq, the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus, the
Serbs and Croats of Yugoslavia, Basques and Spanish of Spain, and so
1
on.

3

Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute permits any U.N. member state to
declare unilaterally at any time that it recognizes "as compulsory ipsofacto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the court in all legal disputes concerning:
a) the interpretation of a treaty; b) any question of international law; c) the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation; d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation."
Two or more States may agree by treaty to refer certain issues to the
Court in the event that they themselves are unable to resolve such issues.
States that are not members of the U.N. may become parties to the Statute
of the Court on an equal footing with U.N. member states. Switzerland,
Liechtenstein and San Marino have done so.
Three tasks of the ICJ are: 1) to decide disputes between States in
accordance with the provisions of its statutes; 2) to perform extra-judicial
activities, including nominating neutral arbitrators or members of conciliation
commissions, at the Parties' request; and 3) to provide judicial guidance and

3oJose M. Ruda, Preface to Shabtai Rosenne The World Court: What It is and How it
Works (4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter Rosenne].
31U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7.
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support for the work of other United Nations organs and for the autonomous
specialized agencies (e.g., International Labor Organization, Food and
Agricultural Organization, U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation). Many constitutions of the specialized agencies contain a provision
stating that disputes between members arising out of the application or
interpretations of their constitutions may be referred to the Court. Article
96(2) of the Charter empowers the 'General Assembly to authorize the
specialized agencies to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising
within the scope of their activities.32
Article 51 of the Statute provides that judgments of the Court in
contentious cases are final and without appeal.33 Such judgments are
binding only on the parties to the case. U.N. Charter Article 94 obligates
each member of the U.N. to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case
to which it is a party. 4 In a case of non-compliance by a party, the other
party has recourse to the Security Council, which may make recommendations or decide on measures it might take to enforce the judgment.35 To
date, the Security Council has not undertaken such enforcement action,
because States generally comply with the Court's decisions.'
Pursuant to Article 96, the General Assembly and the Security Council
may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
any legal question.37 With the authorization of the General Assembly, other
U.N. organs and specialized agencies may also request advisory opinions of
the Court on legal questions arising -within the scope of their activities. 3,
Such decisions are binding only to the extent that the organ requesting the
opinion decides that it will be bound.

32

U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2; see Rosenne, supra note 29, at 35-40.

3 U.N. Charter art. 60. Article 61 provides an exception to this final judgment rule,
allowing a party to apply for revision of the judgment upon discovery of a "decisive factor"
unknown to both the challenging party and the Court. Id. art. 61.
3 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 ("Each member of the U.N. undertakes to comply with the
decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party").
35 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 ("If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may,. . . make recommendations or decide upon measures to
be taken to give effect to the judgment").
' Rosenne, supra note 29, at 41-45.
31 U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1.
3
8/d. art 96, para. 2.
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V. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE ICJ STATUTE

It is time to consider the inclusion of quasi-states within the Court's
jurisdiction. As defined here, "quasi-states" are either ethnic republics within
a federal system (e.g., the former Yugoslavia) or autonomous, ethnic regions
within pluralistic states whose distinct political, legal and ethnic status has
been officially recognized by a central government (e.g., the Trentino-Alto
Adige Region of Italy). Such inclusion would be especially useful in those
cases where the central government and the representatives of the ethnic
autonomous region have entered into a governance agreement that delineates
the two parties' realms of authority, rights, duties and obligations. The U.N.
could encourage such parties to add provisions to such agreements that
obligate the parties to resort to the ICJ for an advisory opinion whenever
they cannot agree on the interpretation of their agreement, for arbitration
whenever they cannot agree on the proper outcome of a dispute, and for a
hearing on the merits (contentious litigation) whenever they cannot
satisfactorily settle a contested claim. In this way, the Court would gain
jurisdiction by the consent of both the central government and the government of the ethnic, autonomous region.
Because states historically have been adverse to granting their cultural
minorities sufficient international legal personality to enjoy standing before
world bodies, Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter declares that "[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter."
The time is ripe for change. Western European states now permit their
citizens to have standing before the European Court of Human Rights to
raise claims against their own governments. The European governments
apparently believe that this arrangement will promote their long term
interests of legitimacy and social stability. With the rising tide of politicized
ethnicity around the world, other governments would find it in their interests
to extend autonomy offers to their rebellious regional minorities and to
assure such minorities of their sincerity by providing for ICJ jurisdiction to
deal with any future disputes over the interpretation of autonomy terms and
the adjudication of claims.
Achieving standing for such "quasi-states" would require an amendment
to Article 34 of the Court's Statute. Any U.N. member state or the Court
itself may propose such an amendment. Article 70 of the Statute empowers
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the Court to propose amendments to the Statute through written communications to the Secretary-General.39 To be successful, a motion must receive
a favorable vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and
ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by
two-thirds of the Members of the U.N., including approval by all the
permanent members of the Security Council.' °
Once such an amendment is passed, any State and internal autonomous
government wishing to have the option of utilizing the ICJ to settle their
future disputes need only add a choice of forum clause to their agreement
that declares their mutual recognition of ICJ jurisdiction and then register
that agreement with the U.N. Secretariat in accordance with U.N. Charter
Article 102.
Although the changes advocated above will not eliminate all intrastate and
interethnic strife, they will offer states and their ethnically-distinct federated
or autonomous regional units a currently unavailable option: the opportunity
to turn to a neutral, third-party judicial tribunal for a fair hearing and,
possibly, a peaceful resolution to their disputes. This option not only offers
troubled multi-ethnic states the talents of outstanding legal minds to address
their problems, it also, through the enforcement clause of U.N. Charter
Article 94(2), potentially involves the attention of the Security Council to
ensure that the Court's judgments are honored.
While the ICJ can potentially help contesting parties resolve their existing
conflicts, wealthier members of the world community can, through their aid
programs, address the antecedent infrastructural and political conditions that
initiate interethnic conflicts.
VI. THE ROLE OF DONOR STATES AND AGENCIES
The economic aid so badly needed by less developed countries can
become an important leverage for human rights improvements. The major
donor countries (U.S., Canada, the western European states, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries), the United Nations and its
various agencies, and non-government organizations (NGOs) must take more
responsible leadership roles in promoting human rights, environmental
ecology, military/arms reductions, population control, and economic
development. All of these factors are interrelated.

" Id. art. 70.
40 U.N. Charter art. 108.
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The world's store of natural resources is finite, and their grossly uneven
distribution and use results in starvation, poverty, civil unrest, suppression,
and war. Therefore, the major arms producing countries of the world must
immediately negotiate arms limitations treaties and cease funneling valuable
world resources to the destructive ends of weapons stockpiles and employment. They must terminate or sharply curtail military aid and arms sales to
poor countries not in clear danger of a foreign threat. Military assistance and
arms sales to states that use their military and police forces to suppress
political opponents and curb human rights must be ceased completely.
All the donor countries must ratify the major U.N. human rights
conventions. Although the former Soviet Union had ratified the Political and
Civil Rights, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the anti-Torture
conventions, the U.S. has signed, but has not ratified them." The foreign
policies of these states as well as the policies and practices of NGOs, U.N.
organizations and U.N.-affiliated organizations, such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, should conform to the principles of the
U.N. Charter and its human rights conventions. Unfortunately, according to
interpretations of World Bank and IMF agreements, only economic
considerations shall be applied to their activities.42 Legally, all the various
U.N. organizations (ILO, WHO, UNESCO, FAO, etc.) and affiliated
organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, are obligated to adhere
to the U.N. Charter and its various declarations and conventions. Hence,
they should all be promoting human rights in their various activities.
With respect to development projects, ecological, technological, demographic and human rights considerations should be regarded as intertwined
and mutually interdependent. Because the objectives of development aid are
to improve the human condition in receiving countries, a focus on human
rights promotion within the context of development is not only appropriate,
but essential. Focusing exclusively on economic factors often results in
funding projects that are ecologically and humanly detrimental.
For example, environmentalists and human rights advocates have been
especially critical of some rural projects funded by the World Bank. They
claim large-scale cattle projects in Latin America have accelerated deforestation, displaced small-scale farmers, and contributed to a further concentration

' For a list of the states which have signed or ratified the major U.N. human rights
conventions, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1992.
42 HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC LAW & DEVELOPMENT: ASSISTANCE POLICIES IN THE

NORDIC COUNTRIES 16 (L.A. Rehof and C. Gulman eds., 1989).
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of land ownership.43 In Africa, the World Bank focused on supporting
tobacco projects between 1974 and 1982, because governments favored the
export earnings that cash crop produced. Unfortunately, tobacco production
had adverse effects on health, ecology and human rights. Because tobacco
was grown on lands that formerly had produced food, local food supplies
decreased and human diets worsened. Tobacco production also depleted soil
fertility, and contributed to regional deforestation and desertification.4 The
ecological and economic collapse in Africa evinces the need for the
international development banks to reevaluate their models of development.45 The wide diffusion of capital-intensive, export-oriented Green
Revolution agricultural systems has caused large-scale ecological deterioration in developing countries. These systems contribute to the dissolution of
small-farmer agriculture, a decrease in per-capita food production, and the
concentration of land in the hands of a few.' s
A number of countries have already made formal policy statements about
the importance of international human rights. The U.S. Department of State
officially proclaims that "[tihe cause of human rights forms the core of
47
American foreign policy; it is central to America's conception of itself."
The foreign aid/human rights policies of such countries as Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, Finland, and the Netherlands are probably even more explicit and
committed than those of the U.S.4" However, even these states are only
now in the process of operationalizing their human rights/developmental
assistance policies.
In order to promote human rights and world stability within the context
of economic assistance by states, NGOs, international donors and multilateral
financial institutions, I make the following recommendations:
(1) The various U.N. conventions on human rights should become the
cornerstone of every donor's policy and objectives.
(2) Each donor should inform every potential or actual recipient of aid
that human rights considerations, as stated in the U.N. conventions, shall

43 S. HELLINGER ET AL., AID FOR JUST DEvELOPMENT:

REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 130 (1988).
4B.M. Rich, The MultilateralDevelopment Banks, Environmental Policy, and the United

States, 12 Ecology L. Q. 699, 700 (1985).
' See id. at 703.

Id. at 739-40.
47United States Department of State, Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy, 24 (1988).
46

48 See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: ASSISTANCE
POLICIES OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES (L.A. Rehof and C. Gulman eds., 1989).
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play a critical role in the selection of projects for funding and in the
subsequent evaluation of projects.
(3) Donors should require that states requesting long-term aid incorporate
the U.N. human rights conventions into their domestic law as a prerequisite
for such aid. Furthermore, donors should require that the legislative powers
of recipient states not pass laws which conflict with or undermine the
principles of the U.N. human rights conventions.
(4) Donors should require governments requesting aid for their domestic
industries to guarantee that these industries will operate in compliance with
the standards of the International Labor Organization.
(5) Donors should favor agricultural projects that are ecologically sound,
increase per capita food production, contribute to improved local diets,
promote employment of people (i.e, labor intensive rather than capital
intensive), and do not promote the concentration of land ownership.
(6) As part of any aid agreement, donors should have the right to curtail,
temporarily stop, redirect or permanently cease any aid in cases where the
recipient disregards or violates its human rights obligations. State parties to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have
committed themselves to achieve full realization of the covenant rights to the
extent of available resources. Here, the human rights process (i.e., progress
towards realization) and demonstrated commitment are important.
In order to adequately deal with the human rights element of foreign
assistance, donor states and agencies may have to add personnel and
departments charged with: 1) educating both donor agency and recipient
country personnel in human rights law, procedures, and goals; 2) assisting
in the design of development projects with human rights components; 3)
supervising projects so as to achieve human rights goals; 4) evaluating
projects on the basis of human rights criteria; 5) investigating and reporting
on human rights performance to the competent decision-makers (e.g.,
organization boards, state congresses or parliaments); 6) and recommending
project continuation, alteration, temporary cessation, or termination on the
basis of human rights achievements or abuses.49
Any donor or aid recipient that complains that the implementation of the
above suggestions would constitute a violation of state sovereignty or an
unwarranted interference with a state's domestic affairs should be informed
that human rights are a matter of international concern to be nurtured both
I9 These reconunendations have been positively influenced by the ideas presented in
Rehof and Gulman, id.
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domestically and internationally. Because the great majority of U.N.
members have signed the key U.N. human rights conventions, the substantive, procedural and processual human rights elements of these conventions
have become modern universal values undiminished by differences in the
cultural traditions of various countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
The present author bases the analysis presented above on the following
hypothesis: Respect for human rights is essential for international peace,
regime stability and legitimacy as well as for long-term economic development. People, regardless of their cultural, ethnic, regional or class affiliations, will recognize as legitimate and support those regimes they regard as
guardians and promoters of their rights to physical, economic, political, and
intellectual security. Conversely, they will deny legitimacy and support to
regimes which violate these rights. They may even actively oppose such
regimes. In reaction to challenges to their power, ruling elites often resort
to military and/or police force to suppress opposition. The social and
material costs of suppression usually involve additional human rights
violations and further strain on already weakened economies.
To promote the causes of interethnic peace and human rights, this writer
offers three recommendations that address the interrelated political, legal, and
infrastructural dimensions of the problem. These recommendations include:
1) the creation, where feasible, of federations or culturally autonomous
regional governments with competencies for local governance, education, and
cultural affairs; 2) a change in the statute of the ICJ so as to permit
governments of federated units or autonomous regions standing before the
ICJ to resolve disputes with their central government; and 3) the conditioning
of international aid on the recipient state's human rights record, and the
channeling of such aid into developmental programs that alleviate the
infrastructural and social causes of interethnic strife and human rights abuses.
The 1990s witnessed the end of the cold war and beginning of great
expectations for a new world order. This writer advocates that respect for
human rights and cultural diversity are essential for the new world order
because they promote the kinds of sustained economic growth and political
stability that comprise the bases for international peace.

